

U.S. BORDER PATROL OCONUS: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH
TO STABILITY OPERATIONS

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Homeland Security Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

U.S. BORDER PATROL OCONUS: POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO STABILITY OPERATIONS, by Anthony Scott Good, 90 pages.

The goal of the United States (U.S.) government is to use a whole of government approach to stability operations in countries around the world. Promoting stability reduces the threat of terrorism and secures the safety and welfare of U.S. interests. One particular area that most always requires security in a host-nation's stabilization is having a safe and secure border.

This paper looks at and identifies the possible assistance that the U.S. Border Patrol could contribute to the whole of government approach to stability operations in host-nations outside of the Continental U.S. (OCONUS). The U.S. Border Patrol has been protecting the U.S. international borders between ports of entry since 1924. Historical interviews of U.S. Border Patrol agents who have contributed to stability operations OCONUS were used to identify the possible contributions and limitations to this process. The U.S. Border Patrol can fill gaps in U.S. military operations in order to secure a host-nation's borders and provide skills and expertise that could be offered to the whole of government approach to stability operations.

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ACRONYMS

ACPA	Assistant Chief Patrol Agent and Associate Chief Patrol Agent (U.S. Border Patrol rank)
APAIC	Assistant Patrol Agent in Charge (U.S. Border Patrol rank)
ATV	All Terrain Vehicle
BORSTAR	Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue
BORTAC	Border Patrol Tactical Team
BTT	Border Transition Team
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COP	Combat Outpost
DBE	Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FOS	Field Operations Supervisor (U.S. Border Patrol rank)
PAIC	Patrol Agent In Charge (U.S. Border Patrol rank)
SBPA	Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (U.S. Border Patrol rank)
UMOPAR	Part of Bolivia's Special Antinarcotics Force—Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (Unidad Móvil Policial Para Reas Rurales) also known as Los Leopardos (the Leopards).
USBP	U.S. Border Patrol
U.S.	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Border security in overseas operations has been written about extensively by the U.S. military; however using the United States Border Patrol (USBP) in stability tasks such as training host-nation security forces and conducting border security overseas lacks study. This thesis focuses on the capabilities that the USBP can offer to the whole of government approach to stability operations. The Department of Defense (DOD) has gaps in its capabilities regarding training police and border security forces of host-nation governments in stability operations, the USBP could fill some of these gaps.

Since 1924, the USBP has safeguarded the international borders of the United States of America (U.S.) between the ports of entry. Since 1984, the Border Patrol Tactical Team (BORTAC) has been operating outside of the U.S., working with the U.S. military, other foreign militaries, and foreign police units in twenty-eight different countries. These operations include antidrug smuggling operations in South America and assisting the U.S. Army with antidrug smuggling and counter terrorism operations in Iraq.¹

Other members of the USBP outside of BORTAC have also advised and trained host-nation security forces. During the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. saw a large increase in illegal immigration and drug smuggling into the country. As a result, the USBP increased in size, technology, and capability to counteract the growth in illegal activity.

¹U.S. Border Patrol, "BORTAC History and Overview," <http://www.bortac.com/> (accessed 7 September 2009).

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 changed America's approach to terrorism. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in response to these terrorist attacks. The USBP then moved from the Department of Justice to DHS. With this new structure and heightened focus on antiterrorism the USBP has almost doubled in manpower and has greatly improved in technological advances, resources, and training.²

Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. went from a law enforcement approach on terrorism inside the U.S. to declaring a global war on terrorism where the U.S. military and other federal agencies increased their efforts to proactively stop terrorist organizations. Since the attacks, the U.S. increased resources and efforts to defend against the threat of terrorism significantly. The main effort is fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the U.S. must be prepared to protect the nation and its interests all over the world. The Al Qaeda terrorist threat is one that will threaten the U.S. for many years to come and the U.S. must be prepared to use all means necessary to protect the homeland.³ DOD Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* describes the strategic environment that the U.S. faces globally. Both national and transnational threats appear, disappear, or go into remission on a constant basis. The U.S. has to move with these changes and adjust strategies as required. The U.S. military faces challenges such as

²U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "The History of CBP," http://nemo.customs.gov/opa/TimeLine_062409.swf (accessed 3 December 2009).

³U.S. President Barack Obama, "Protecting Our Security and Our Values" (President Obama's speech delivered at The National Archives Museum, Washington, DC, 21 May 2009); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), v.

insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. The U.S. military should to remain the most advanced military power in the world.⁴

U.S. military doctrine has identified a need for stability operations. In regards to stability operations, the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, appendix A, mentions the need for a “comprehensive approach with a shared understanding and appreciation for the intended end state.” The FM goes on to give a limited overview of the various departments that the U.S. Army can expect to work with in support of stability operations.⁵ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* went more in depth and listed DHS as a key organization to counterinsurgency (COIN).⁶

Looking further into U.S. military doctrine, DOD Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During, Joint Operations* volume I recognizes DHS as the U.S. federal government’s primary agency for coordinating DOD and civil support to stability within the U.S.⁷ Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During, Joint Operations* volume II lists

⁴Department of Defense, Joint Publications (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006, Incorporated Change 1, 2008), I-1.

⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-15.

⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-6.

⁷Department of Defense, Joint Publications (JP) 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During, Joint Operations Vol I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), II-6.

the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as one of eight agencies under DHS that conducts border security operations inside the U.S.⁸ The Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 states that interagency efforts will be necessary for rebuilding “host-nation institutions, including various types of security forces.”⁹ This directive describes the need for assistance in stability operations.

Stability operations are important to the U.S. and the world because instability in other countries affects other nations’ economics, security, and their susceptibility to terrorism.¹⁰ The overall goal of stability operations is to promote a stable indigenous government that can regulate and support itself, thus reducing influence from external factors. The negative external influences can include terrorist organizations and criminal factions forming or conducting business in the unstable environments.¹¹

Stability operations are not new practices for the U.S. government. According to Bard E. O’Neill, the author of *Insurgency and Terrorism, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, the U.S. military has carried out more stability operations than any other type of

⁸Department of Defense, Joint Publications (JP) 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol II* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), A-D-4–A-E-2.

⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-15.

¹⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-3.

¹¹O’Neill, 31-50.

mission in its history. Since World War II there has been an average of eight wars going on at any given time globally.¹²

In 1965 there were approximately two hundred terrorist incidents a year; by 1985 this number rose to approximately eight hundred incidents. The U.S. has used the military in stability operations in many countries. Often times these efforts were coordinated in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and other federal agencies.¹³

The USBP has not played a large role in stability operations outside of the U.S. Effective border security is an integral requirement for a host-nation to secure peace and stability for its people. The thesis for this paper is that the USBP should assist in the conduct of overseas stability operations by providing Border Patrol agents to train host-nation border security forces, thus contributing specialized skill sets to the United State's whole of government approach.

The primary question of this paper is, how should the USBP contribute to the whole of government approach to stability operations? To effectively answer this question, secondary questions were answered. Subordinate questions involving the local sentiment of the host-nation, the USBP's limitations, and overall effectiveness were studied. Secondary questions included: Describe the training involved when they were deployed; Who was being trained, was the training effective, and what was the focus of the training?; and what types of police work functions, investigations and border security tasks were performed while deployed?

¹²Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (New York: Brassey's Inc., Maxwell Macmillan Pergamon Publishing Corp, 1990), 1; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-1, 1-2.

¹³*Ibid.*

The interviews identified an overview of the USBP's participation in the whole of government approach to stability operations. The interviews were conducted with USBP agents who had worked outside of the U.S. and focused on the four capabilities (training, police work, investigations, and border security).

There were four criteria, which were: (1) what was effective, (2) what was not effective, (3) what needs improvement, and (4) what the capabilities are or could be, to determine the USBP's productiveness of deploying or participating in future operations in the whole of government approach.

The literature review examined the future of stability operations for the U.S. military and what the DHS sees as the future of interagency participation in stability operations. The U.S. military has recognized that they do require the assistance of other federal agencies to effectively stabilize a host-nation. The literature review found that effective border control leads to a show of government competence, increase of state revenue, and promotes a stable environment. Insurgents use many tactics to delegitimize host-nation governments while trying to win a population's support. And preventing the establishment and use of sanctuary is an effective means of stopping external support for insurgents.

Afghanistan was also identified in the literature review as the theater in which USBP support is in immediate need. The USBP has not provided the U.S. military or the Afghanistan government the support that they are capable of providing to the porous borders of Afghanistan.

This paper found the USBP possesses assets, resources, skill sets, and capabilities that can fill the gaps in the U.S. military to achieve stability in a host-nation. The training

and advisory roles were found to be the most relevant among USBP capabilities. The research of this paper also found several USBP limitations to supporting the U.S. military overseas, primarily a lack of resources and planning capability.

There are a large number of tasks that are involved in stability operations depending on the type of environments and issues at hand. FM 3-07 lists several stability tasks that are performed in various environments. These include supporting partner nations during peacetime military engagements or peacetime operations to enforce international peace agreements. This also includes supporting other nations by providing disaster relief; supporting nations during irregular warfare; supporting nations during major combat operations, and during post-conflict operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities.¹⁴

This thesis identifies the USBP as a U.S. federal agency that could support a host-nation during peacetime, conflict, or post conflict with irregular warfare and ensuring border security. According to FM 3-07, part of any legitimate government is that it “Maintains order within its own borders, protects independent and impartial systems of justice, punishes crime, embraces the rule of law, and resists corruption.”¹⁵ Stability operations work toward creating legitimacy and improving those factors.

Many unstable nations do not or cannot effectively provide enough security for their country or worse they have no control over the security of their territories.¹⁶ FM 3-

¹⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-3.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (St Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 35.

07 states that in any nation, “effective, accountable, border guards encourage trade and economic activity, facilitating the ability of the state to generate revenue and investment.”¹⁷ FM 3-07 goes on to say that in a failed state or a nation with a failed system of border control will see “failure erode confidence, fuel conflict, and threaten security. This often results in increased trafficking in illegal arms, goods, and human capital.”¹⁸ Border security is a fundamental and necessary requirement of any nation to remain secure.

The comprehensive approach is a commonly used term that describes “an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”¹⁹ The “whole of government” is an approach in which the DOD consults and works with other U.S. federal government agencies to achieve U.S. government goals.²⁰ This term is used widely in the DOD as well as in Congressional and Presidential documents. As defined in FM 3-07, stability operations “is an overarching term encompassing various missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure

¹⁷Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 6-16.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 1-4.

²⁰Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 2.

reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”²¹ Stability operations require assistance from other U.S. government agencies, beyond the capabilities of the U.S. military alone.

Counter Insurgency (COIN) is either a direct approach to defeat an insurgency or an indirect approach to separate an insurgency from its political objectives.²² Terrorism “is a form of warfare in which violence is directed primarily against noncombatants (usually unarmed civilians), rather than operational military and police forces or economic assets (public or private).”²³ A failed state is “a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government.”²⁴ Insurgency is a movement that methodically moves to overthrow an already existing government.²⁵ The failed state can be vulnerable by not being able to or refusal to provide enough security or necessary services to the majority of the government; or the failed state is in crisis, by which the government will not or cannot control its territories effectively.²⁶

This chapter focused on the background of the USBP, the U.S. military, and the questions to be answered in an effort to identify gaps in the U.S. military’s capabilities in their efforts for stability operations. This chapter also identified the hypothesis for this

²¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2-5.

²²John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 101.

²³O’Neil, 24.

²⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-10.

²⁵Galula, 4.

²⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-10.

thesis, which is the USBP can and should assist in the success of overseas efforts by providing Border Patrol agents to train host-nation border security forces and to conduct border security, thus contributing specialized skill sets to the United State's whole of government approach to stability operations.

The next chapter is a literature review of various sources that answer questions from chapter 1 and to review data regarding current procedures and past practices in stability operations, as well as lessons learned by first hand author accounts, and experts in the field.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review focuses on relevant literature to give insight on key points and important facts to answer the questions discussed in chapter 1 of this paper. Several themes were used to focus on the questions and thesis. These were: insurgency and stability, the implications of border crossing, and overall border security. This review established current procedures and past practices in stability operations, as well as lessons learned by first hand author accounts, and experts in the field. Security forces requirements and functions were identified. Topics such as joint organization, as well as insurgency, terrorism ideologies, tactics, and strategies were also reviewed.

Insurgency and Stability

Insurgency creates instability in a region. Insurgents use many tactics to delegitimize the government, while winning over the populations support. Lack of control on the international borders of that region can further contribute to instability. The director of the International Relations Program at St. Joseph's University, Anthony James notes:

If across-border supplies to guerillas cannot be interdicted, or at least limited, then no level of counterinsurgent commitment on the part of the ruling regime is likely to be adequate. Therefore, all possible diplomatic and military means must be harnessed to this fundamental objective. The failure to cut guerillas off from supplies coming across international borders, and to prevent the easy passage of guerillas across those lines, has been the undoing of major counterinsurgencies from Napoleonic Spain to Soviet Afghanistan.²⁷

²⁷Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 236.

This excerpt depicts the importance of strong border security combined with the need for COIN efforts. This requires stability operations to include interagency and multinational coordination. History has many examples to illustrate that a lack of border control contributes to a failure of COIN.. Success is difficult to achieve for COIN if the insurgent cannot be contained or isolated.

Insurgents turn to narcotics trafficking and organized crime as a way to pay for their efforts. Crimes such as kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, and drug trafficking are popular among insurgent groups. Illegal drug trafficking and sales provide the insurgent groups with a high profit margin that requires very little investment money.²⁸ With this large profit margin, guerilla warfare, terrorism, coups, and conventional warfare can all be used as insurgent strategy.²⁹ The tactics seen here are similar to the tactics used by drug cartels and smuggling organizations on the U.S. international borders.

Professor of International Affairs at the National War College in Washington DC, Bard E. O'Neill stated that insurgency starts with a political crisis of some kind. War scholar and lecturer in International Relations at Birkbeck College in London, Antoine Bousquet, expressed that "States, along with other political entities, seek to employ organized violence in a manner such as to attain certain political objectives."³⁰ This political agenda usually entails the overthrow of a particular government.

²⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-11.

²⁹O'Neil, 31-50.

³⁰Antoine Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 10.

Journalist John Hendren points out that insurgency tactics are not always successful when countered with COIN. For example, many Sunni insurgents in Iraq saw the U.S. military as an invading force and a threat to their nation. However, when they realized that the U.S. was working on the behalf of the people and they witnessed Al Qaida causing them harm they switched sides and began to support the U.S. in the COIN efforts. This became known as the Sunni awakening.³¹

It is also important to realize that insurgents are not usually amenable to compromising their goals.³² One overarching goal of terrorism is to slowly destroy support of a government by creating fear for all supporters of the nation's government, both internally and externally.³³ Likewise, Antoine Bousquet notes that "the imposition of chaos on the adversary is generally the requisite for victory in war."³⁴ These terrorist actions are also used by insurgents to show that the government is incapable of controlling the nation or protecting its people.³⁵ Organizations such as Al Qaeda have attempted to use similar tactics in the U.S. and many other parts of the world.

According to Historian Matt M. Mathews, in 1911 U.S. President William Howard Taft considered the Mexican revolution as an insurgency. Mexican soldiers and criminals spilled over into the U.S. with violence and criminal activities. In response,

³¹John Hendren, "Sunni Awakening: Insurgents are now Allies," *Wars in Iraq*, 12 December 2007, <http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/151616> (accessed 19 February 2010).

³²O'Neil, 22.

³³*Ibid.*, 25.

³⁴Bousquet, 240.

³⁵O'Neil, 70.

President Taft deployed over thirty thousand troops to the U.S. and Mexico international border. This effort proved successful and America's borders remained stable.³⁶

Many times, insurgency starts when conditions begin to improve in the host-nation. When citizens see the end of a conflict with U.S. involvement they expect that all of their problems will be solved immediately. According to David Galula, the citizens of the host-nation soon become agitated that conditions have not improved soon enough and they begin supporting or participating in insurgency. Conventional warfare requires large amounts of people and resources; however in irregular warfare, insurgents need fewer people and resources to be effective over a large area. This is why many more security forces are required for counterinsurgency operations.³⁷ This need for additional forces is a gap that will need to be filled by a military or another government agency.

Doctrine is not the only way that militaries and organizations learn. In fact, doctrine is usually slow to adapt to necessary changes.³⁸ Military and training schools can and have also been used throughout history to teach adaptive skills in changing environments.³⁹ However, globalization through technology has advanced faster than educational systems. Foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman points out that

³⁶Matt M. Mathews, The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 22, *The U.S. Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, July 2007), 60-70.

³⁷Galula, 11-25; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-2.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 38.

³⁹*Ibid.*, 7.

populaces around the world now “definitely know ‘of’ each other, but we still don’t know that much ‘about’ each other.”⁴⁰

External Support to Insurgency

Some countries knowingly or unknowingly create or provide safe havens for insurgent groups. Anthony James Joes advocates that these nations create vulnerabilities to neighboring nations when they geographically border them. The insurgent groups use these safe havens as their sustainment routes and bases of operations. The safe havens provide the insurgents a location in which they can rebuild and regroup without interference from COIN operations. The ideal secure base for an insurgent group will be in underdeveloped areas, close to an international border, in rough terrain, and with little transportation accessibility.⁴¹

Even though their base is important to them, insurgents are not able to defend their bases and thus will become mobile and abandon the base if needed.⁴² Therefore, COIN requires secure borders and the elimination of these safe havens to stop the traversing of insurgents from neighboring borders. As Anthony James Joes stated, COIN methods used for this include “diplomacy, fortified lines, ground patrols, naval blockade, and air interdiction.”⁴³ David Galula remarks that all countries are divided by territories,

⁴⁰Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Douglas and MacIntyre LTD., 1999), 106.

⁴¹Joes, 17-18.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 103; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-16.

provinces, states, or zones of some kind. These separations are created for military and administrative purposes. The borders of these separated areas will always be vulnerable zones against insurgencies.⁴⁴ Roger Trinquier contends that terrorist organizations can be completely eliminated by cutting off their cross border mobility.⁴⁵

Afghanistan is a good example the importance of border security to prevent sanctuary and external support for terrorist organizations across international borders. Afghanistan is also an example of a failed government with an insurgency where a host-nation needs support to create stability.⁴⁶ The previous Afghanistan government, known as the Taliban, started in 1994. Afghanistan was in a state of anarchy and lacked important social justice mechanisms. The local populace of Afghanistan began to turn to a religious group headed by Mohammed Omar for enforcement of social law for wrong doings against the people. For example, if a tribal man's daughter was raped, the group would execute the criminals responsible and promote fear into anyone who followed them. With plenty of jobless and tribal young men to join, the Taliban grew quickly.⁴⁷

Later, the Taliban began crossing international borders and training new recruits in weapons, tactics, and religion in Pakistan; recruiting heavily from the Islamic schools of Pakistan. After Al Qaida's September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn Osama Bin Laden over to them. The Taliban supported

⁴⁴Galula, 35.

⁴⁵Trinquier, 71.

⁴⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 1-4.

⁴⁷Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban*, rev ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 279-292.

Al Qaida and refused. In response, the U.S. began to occupy Afghanistan.⁴⁸ The U.S. has seen Taliban forces from Afghanistan and from across borders attacking U.S. occupation in Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided intelligence and other forms of support to the Taliban as well.⁴⁹

In the book *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Afghanistan is described as a failed state that has been incrementally pulled apart by its surrounding nations over a long period of time. In 1979 the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan.⁵⁰ Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau provide more literature on Afghanistan in the book *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare*. In this book Jalali and Grau discuss the Soviet problems while they were occupying Afghanistan. Here the Soviets failed to apply appropriate levels of forces to combat the guerrilla Afghan fighters. The book also points out that while the Mujahideen were successful in guerrilla warfare, they were never successful in the creation and use of a large conventional force.⁵¹ The history of insurgents and terrorist using Afghanistan as a refuge or sanctuary shows that governments must and do take action against these sanctuaries in order to protect the people and maintain legitimacy. Part of stopping these sanctuaries from forming or gaining strength is the use of border security in an effort to stop the flow of cross border traffic and resupply of sanctuaries.

⁴⁸Ibid., 279-292, 324.

⁴⁹Tanner, 332-336.

⁵⁰James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003), 129-146.

⁵¹Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, *Afghan Guerrilla Warfare, In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters* (London: Compendium Publishing Ltd., 2001), 397-406.

In his book *Charlie Wilson's War*, George Crile describes how the U.S. government supplied the Afghan Guerrilla forces with weaponry and ammunition to defeat the Soviet Army in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. U.S. House of Representatives Congressman, Charlie Wilson, worked to substantially increase funding for the Central Intelligence Agency. Then Congressman Wilson was able to pay for Soviet arms from Egypt. The Central Intelligence Agency and Congressman Wilson made sure to supply the Afghani people with Soviet weapons, so that the U.S. would not appear to be supplying or directly attacking the Soviets. Egypt had previously stockpiled Soviet weaponry and munitions and also had factories that could produce much more in a short amount of time.⁵² A lack of border security allowed for ease of access and smuggling routes to transport arms and supplies into Afghanistan.

Many insurgent groups work in urban environments where concealment and secrecy are prevalent. The military turns to specially trained police and investigative agencies in these instances.⁵³ The British partially attributed their success in Malaya when they used this tactic from 1951 to 1953. Here, the British trainers and instructors trained over 250,000 Home Guard security forces. This single training camp was comprised of Malayan nationals who were successful in COIN in 72 villages throughout Malaya.⁵⁴

⁵²George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 35-39.

⁵³O'Neill, 128-129.

⁵⁴Nagl, 99.

John A. Nagl underlines that “If security forces treat insurgents as criminals the police may retain the primary relationship for their arrest, detention, and prosecution.”⁵⁵ David Galula agrees that these tasks should be assigned to the judicial system and the police force, which will greatly improve the criminal process and reduce the burden on the military as well. Something such as interrogating insurgent detainees by amateurs would be inefficient and dangerous.⁵⁶

Border Security

A major component to securing a border is the use of technology, gathering intelligence, and exploiting terrain. Thomas L. Friedman recognized that in recent years, the world has experienced exponential advances in technology, global financing, and information sharing. With these advances people all over the globe feel the limitations and opportunities that require adaptation. Communications has seen rapid developments in computerization, miniaturization, and telecommunications.⁵⁷ With technology smaller and lighter weapons of mass effect can be moved more inconspicuously.

The USBP has great experience adapting technology to border security. According to journalist Stew Magnuson, CBP is expanding its use of unmanned aerial vehicles in its operations on the northern and Caribbean U.S. borders. First used with the U.S. military, the Predator B UAV has proved highly successful with U.S. border surveillance. The Predator B flies higher than eighteen thousand feet making it easier to

⁵⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 6-20.

⁵⁶Galula, 87, 124.

⁵⁷Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 41-59.

fly with the Federal Aviation Administration's approval. Larger UAVs such as the U.S. military's Global Hawk show even more promise, however, higher costs make the fielding difficult. CBP is currently creating command and control centers along U.S. borders to expand the UAV program.⁵⁸ According to Market, in his article "The Buzz 'Drones' On," the same Predator B that is currently used by the U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan was first used by the USBP in North Dakota to conduct surveillance on the U.S. side of the border between the ports of entry.⁵⁹

Another major component of border security is the use of intelligence. Security forces excel in intelligence gathering as well. David Galula contends that "intelligence is the principal source of information on guerillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe. The populace does not feel safe until the insurgent's power has been broken."⁶⁰ Roger Trinquier notes that "Fear of reprisal will always prevent them from communication to us information they poses."⁶¹ Intelligence can come from civilian informants or captured detainees. Intelligence alone is of no value if the information is not acted on or exploited quickly.⁶² The key to COIN is good intelligence coupled with strategy. Timely intelligence lets the COIN know how

⁵⁸Stew Magnuson, "Border Protection Agency Outlines New Plans for Unmanned Aircraft," *National Defense*, December 2007, 13.

⁵⁹"The Buzz 'Drones' On," *SecurityMagazine*, September 2009, http://www.securitymagazine.com/Articles/Government_News/BNP_GUID_9-5-2006_A_10000000000000674070 (accessed 4 November 2009), 20.

⁶⁰Galula, 72.

⁶¹Trinquier, 35.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 37.

the war is doing, gain the identity of insurgent participants, and prevent the underestimation of the insurgent force.⁶³

Terrain is another important aspect to border security operations. Various differences in a geographical area determine the insurgents' and border security forces' strategy. For example, an open desert makes guerrilla warfare difficult with air and video surveillance covering vast areas. Dense terrain areas such as Afghanistan make guerrilla warfare difficult to counter for security forces.⁶⁴

The USBP encounters similar terrain issues on the international borders of the U.S. According to USBP strategy, it takes the right combination of people, infrastructure and technology given the terrain you are trying to secure. The USBP has unique experience within the federal government accomplishing these requirements.⁶⁵

Security forces for a host-nation include military, police, border control, and other military type organizations. Developing security forces entails equipping, training, and advising host-nations. Therefore, trainers and advisors play an important role in transitioning a government from U.S. control back to the control of the host-nation. The challenge for any foreign government to ensure stability in a failed state is governing, controlling, and assisting the populace. For example, the U.S. had little difficulty entering

⁶³Joes, 145-146.

⁶⁴O'Neill, 53-55.

⁶⁵Office of the Border Patrol, National Border Patrol Strategy Policy, June 2005, 2-3.

militarily into Afghanistan, however establishing stability and conducting COIN will take an exceptional amount of effort and resources.⁶⁶

Conclusion

The literature review found that effective border control leads to a show of government competence, increased state revenue, and promotes a stable environment. Insurgents use many tactics to delegitimize host-nation governments while trying to win a populations support. And preventing the establishment and use of sanctuary is an effective means of stopping external support for insurgents.

Afghanistan was also identified in the literature review as the theatre in which USBP support is in immediate need. The USBP has not provided the U.S. military or the Afghanistan government the support that they are capable of providing to the porous borders of Afghanistan.

The literature shows that the U.S. military is capable of performing stability operations. However there are gaps that can be filled by civilian agencies, reducing the strain on military forces and having a more valued effect by using specialized skills for particular tasks. The U.S. military has historically conducted stability operations and continues to fight insurgencies and terrorism overseas with stability operations. There are procedures in place for joint operations involving limited use of civilian agencies and there are limitations to the level of civilian participation.

⁶⁶Tanner, 319-320.

CHAPTER 3

MEHODOLOGY

In chapter 1, this thesis focused on the background of the USBP, the U.S. military, and the questions to be answered in an effort to identify gaps in the U.S. military's capabilities in their efforts for stability operations. The U.S. military has been conducting border security as well as training border security forces; the USBP has been performing similar tasks on a much smaller scale.

Chapter 1 also identified the hypothesis for this thesis, which is the USBP can and should assist in the success of overseas efforts by providing Border Patrol agents to train host-nation border security forces and to conduct border security, thus contributing specialized skill sets to the United State's whole of government approach to stability operations.

In the literature review various sources were reviewed to answer questions from chapter 1 and to review data regarding current procedures and past practices in stability operations, as well as lessons learned by first hand author accounts, and experts in the field. Security forces requirements and functions were identified. Topics such as joint organization, as well as insurgency, terrorism ideologies, tactics, and strategies were also reviewed.

The research portion of the thesis, presented in chapter 4, used interviews with various USBP agents to analyze past practices, problems, performance, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the USBP on the borders of the continental U.S. as well as overseas

in recent years. These interviews gave information about what the USBP can contribute to fill gaps that the U.S. military faces while conducting stability operations.

The methodology used an exploratory study consisting of historical interviews. A purposive sampling was used, in which those who have pertinent experiences or information were chosen for interview. The interviewees were unique by position and experience to create a descriptive view of current contributions by the USBP and their capabilities for future contributions.

The assessment of the interviews evaluates each question to determine whether or not a void can be filled for the U.S. military. The criteria then compared and contrasted for conflicting views or showed corroboration and validity for similar views. Different views and answers were triangulated or acknowledged as irreconcilable. This provided a basis for validity by producing accurate and credible results.

The questions evaluated were skills, experiences, resources applied by the USBP, limitations and obstacles, effectiveness of border security, and effectiveness of training of border security forces. All of these questions were filtered to answer four criteria, which were: (1) what was effective, (2) what was not effective, (3) what needs improvement, and (4) what the capabilities are or could be, to determine the USBP's productiveness of deploying or participating in future operations in the whole of government approach.

The interviewees were asked what events and operations were they involved in that directly support the whole of government approach to stability operations. These included USBP agents who have worked in Iraq, Europe, Asia, and South America training host-nation border security, providing disaster relief, involvement in anti-drug

smuggling operations, and anti-arms trafficking operations. Interagency coordination with host-nations, such as the USBP in Honduras and Iraq were found pertinent.

In an effort to receive honest and revealing responses each of the main topic questions were asked in five different ways to each interview participant. The first was to describe the training involved when they were deployed. This question lead to other questions, such as who was being trained, was the training effective, and what was the focus of the training? A description of the training speaks to the criteria of what the USBP can provide to a host-nation, that the U.S. military may not be able to provide or training that could be better or more specialized if given by the USBP.

Common responses were types of specialized training to host-nation security forces in border security, to include checkpoint operations, sign cutting, sensor applications, drug interdiction, routes of egress identification, detainee processing, and prisoner handling. In order to ensure accuracy the question was asked again in the following ways: Was the training to the host-nation forces effective? How effective was the training to the security forces? What types of training was conducted? Did the training accomplish the mission requirements?

Subjects were also asked what types of police work functions were performed. As federal agents, USBP agents have a wealth of experience in police work to include accident investigation, crime prevention and identification, domestic response, processing and detention of detainees, and dealing with public concerns. The responses to this question identified the application of USBP experience from the borders of the U.S. to its application and use overseas in support of other host-nations.

Questions about police functions were asked in various ways: Did you perform any policing activities while deployed? Please describe the common police practices that were used while in the host-nation.; Do you feel that the police work that you performed was effective? Why do you believe that the policing functions were successful to your mission?

Participants were asked what types of investigations were performed while they were deployed. Investigations is a police work skill that goes more in-depth to identify trends of smuggling humans and contraband and creates actionable intelligence that can be used by the USBP and other involved agencies or militaries. Investigations promote the formal due process of prosecutions and identifies other participants or criminals as well. This question gathered data on how effective USBP investigations were in a host-nation. To find the methods and effectiveness of investigations several questions were asked to get accurate and truthful responses.

Finally, a description of the border security tasks performed was asked to all interviewees. Responses to this question gained similar responses to the previous four questions; however, it also allowed the interviewee the opportunity to go more in-depth to the USBP's contributions and experiences applied in a particular host-nation.

To obtain the experience that USBP agents used in host-nations they were asked the following rephrased questions: What were the functions that you performed as a USBP agent in the host-nation in regards to border security? What specific border security tasks were you charged to perform? How effective were the border security tasks performed in the host-nation? What were the measures of effectiveness of the border security tasks performed?

USBP leaders operating in the U.S. and their experiences with coordination of militaries and other agencies may also be informative, especially to the current capabilities and effectiveness of the USBP. The interviewees were also asked about relevant periods of time that the events or operations occurred, their rank now and at the time of the operations, and any other pertinent information to the topic at hand. A complete list of initial interview questions are listed in Appendix A attached to this document. These questions were used as a guide to give the interviews direction and focus on criteria.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

U.S. DOD manuals were analyzed as evidence for the importance of border security and the use of federal government agencies in support of the whole of government approach to stability operation. The U.S. DOD manuals recognized the importance of border security to promote stability and to stop insurgency. These manuals also identified gaps in stability operations that need filled by other federal agencies.

The historical interviews were conducted with USBP agents who had worked outside of the U.S. and focused on the four capabilities (training, police work, investigations, and border security). Secondary questions involving the local sentiment of the host-nation, the USBP's limitations, and overall effectiveness were also studied. The interviews provided an overview of the USBP's participation in the whole of government approach to stability operations. The interviews also identified the areas in which they are accustomed to assisting overseas efforts; such areas included training, police work, investigations, and border security functions.

U.S. DOD Manuals

Ensuring that a failed state can establish and administer a rule of law is important and requires dedicated efforts. Laws must be established and upheld. Criminals must be held accountable for their actions. FM 3-07 states the following objectives required to ensure this rule of law: just legal frameworks established, law and order enforced

accountability to the law, access to justice ensured, citizen participation promoted, culture of lawfulness promoted, and public security established.⁶⁷

When identifying essential tasks for stability operations, FM 3-07 points out that one of the primary essential tasks is to “Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement.”⁶⁸

A central component of civil security is the ability of the state to monitor and regulate its borders. Generally, border and coast guard forces secure national boundaries while customs officials regulate the flow of people, animals, and goods across state borders. These border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine.⁶⁹

To maintain control of a territory:

External actors and host-nation military forces provide the necessary border security and control while trainers and advisors focus on training host-nation border control forces. These border security activities include managing land border areas, airspace, coastal and territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones. The control of border areas and crossings prevents smuggling, movement of irregular forces into host nation territory, and uncontrolled flow of refugees.⁷⁰

FM 3-07 listed several requirements in support of this. The first requirement would be an initial response in which military forces establish border control and boundary security as well as establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement. This would include dismantling roadblocks, establishing checkpoints, and ensuring freedom of movement. At

⁶⁷Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-16.

⁶⁸Ibid., 3-4.

⁶⁹Ibid., 6-16.

⁷⁰Ibid.

the same time, an effort must be made to train and equip border control and boundary security forces.⁷¹

In their article titled “Indian Federalism and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Border States: ‘State Participation and Central Accommodation since 1990,’” Rafiq Dossani and Srinidhi Vijaykumar point out that “Many times a border security force is considered a paramilitary force because it occupies a hazy area between being part of a police force and being a professional military organization.”⁷² Special skill sets and experiences are needed for an organization that is both a paramilitary force as well as a police force at the same time.

Due to the inherent expertise of civilian agencies, the DOD prefers civilian agency involvement in stability operations. FM 3-24 insists “However, the ability of such agencies to deploy to foreign countries in sustainable numbers and with ready access to necessary resources is usually limited.”⁷³ The USBP has seen increases in personnel, but many portions of the U.S. borders remain undermanned.⁷⁴ Police forces, like military forces, require trained personnel, firearm armors, supply specialists, communications personnel, administrative personnel, and vehicle mechanics.⁷⁵

⁷¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-4.

⁷²Rafiq Dossani, and Srinidhi Vijaykumar, “Indian Federalism and the Conduct of Foreign Policy in Border States: State Participation and Central Accommodation since 1990.” *Storenstein APARC* (March 2005), 11.

⁷³Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2-9.

⁷⁴Mark Krikorian, and Steve Camarota, How Did the Terrorist Get In?, *The Social Contract* 12, no. 1 (Fall 2001): 74.

⁷⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 6-21.

Doctrine assumes there are many agencies and departments involved in stability operations with various “experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities.”⁷⁶ One of the U.S. military’s biggest challenges is pulling them all together to achieve the same goals. This FM goes even further to state “military forces must build strong relationships through cooperation and coordination.”⁷⁷ After a conflict it is imperative to control the level of violence within a host-nation. Violence stops other agencies from assisting in the stability operations, thus benefitting the insurgents’ agenda.⁷⁸

Sovereignty is also an important aspect to working with any host-nation. The coordination with the host-nation through the U.S. Ambassador usually aids in ensuring that political sensitivities are addressed early in the process.⁷⁹ Some important sovereignty issues are aerial ports of debarkation, basing, border crossings, collecting and sharing information, protection (tasks related to preserving the force), jurisdiction over members of U.S. and multinational forces, location and access, operations in territorial waters, over flight rights, police operations including: arrests, detention, penal and justice authority and procedures, railheads, and seaports of debarkation.⁸⁰

The DOD forms Joint Interagency Coordination Groups as a means for the combatant commander to use interagency support in COIN operations. The DOD’s top

⁷⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, A-1.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2-1.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

priority should be improving interagency coordination in the war on terrorism.⁸¹ These Joint Interagency Coordination Groups represent their agencies that are deployed and act as a liaison with the combatant commander so the he or she understands each agency's expertise. During COIN operations, the U.S. military can assist civilian security forces in the arrest of war criminals, supporting police presence and search patrols, providing logistic support, controlling crowds and urban unrest, detaining suspected felons, securing key facilities, and providing advisors to the police.⁸²

To support a host-nation in internal defense and development, Joint Publication 3-07.1 describes the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID is the combined effort of government agencies, other allied nations, and/or the U.S. military that are working toward freeing and protecting a host-nation populace from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID is usually preventative in nature and works most effectively with interagency support. FID can use the military, politics, economics, and information to influence a host-nation. Indirectly, FID can support a host-nation by focusing on self-sufficiency. Many times this includes joint training exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, psychological operations, logistical support, information sharing, and security guidance.⁸³

A review of DOD doctrine has identified the requirements for border security in an effort to create a stabilized region. Interviews with USBP agents who have

⁸¹Schaubelt, 1.

⁸²Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2-10.

⁸³Department of Defense, Joint Publications 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), ix-xv.

participated in stability operations overseas were used to identify how those requirements are currently being met. The interviews also identified gaps and limitations to the U.S. military's requirements for successful stability operations.

Training/Advisory

All of the USBP agents that were interviewed were involved in some sort of training to host-nation security forces. The following USBP agents were interviewed regarding their overseas efforts with the USBP: Associate Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) Peter Hermansen; Assistant Chief Patrol Agents (ACPA) Randall Baldwin, Gerald S. Bryan, and Anthony Porvaznik; Patrol Agents in Charge Gregory Bovino, Desi D. DeLeon, Vincent J. Hampel, and Timothy Sullivan; and Border Patrol Agents (BPA) Mauricio Benitez and Anthony E. Rodriguez.

In Iraq, ACPA Randall Baldwin described a transition in training. ACPA Baldwin mentioned that DHS is not focusing on training as it had in the past in Iraq. The main focus now (2009 forward) for DHS is advising and mentoring the Iraqi leaders and coalition forces.⁸⁴ In 2006, Border Patrol Agent (BPA) Mauricio Benitez had a more training and operational role in Iraq during his deployment.⁸⁵

ACPA Baldwin did provide training to his U.S. Army counterparts while in Iraq. He provided training and training support materials and references to U.S. Army Border Transition Teams (BTT). This training was designed to enable the BTT's to train the

⁸⁴Randall Baldwin, Assistant Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 March 2010.

⁸⁵Mauricio Benitez, Border Patrol, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 29 March 2010.

Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) officers. ACPA Baldwin was pleased with his interactions with the BTT's and felt that the training that he provided them filled a gap in the U.S. Army's abilities to train other's in border security. He was also confident that the BTT's understood and were capable of carrying out this training. The types of training conducted were USBP field tactics training.⁸⁶

As a member of BORTAC and a Field Operations Supervisor (FOS) in 2005, Patrol Agent in Charge (PAIC) Desi D. DeLeon recalled his training and advisory role in Jordan. PAIC DeLeon was in charge of a sixteen man team that consisted of fifteen USBP agents and one Office of Field Operations officer. Stationed at the International Police Training Center in Jordan, PAIC DeLeon and his team trained the Iraqi border police (nicknamed the Desert Wolves).⁸⁷

Most of the students were prior Iraqi military personnel. PAIC DeLeon stated that the initial student course was two weeks in duration and encompassed such subjects as logistics, tactical tracking, patrol interdiction, checkpoint operations, fraud document identification, firearms training, and basic police skills. The course was similar to a USBP academy; however it only lasted two weeks as opposed to the approximate five months for the USBP academy for USBP agents.⁸⁸

From the pool of 1533 students trained, PAIC DeLeon's team identified 390 students who would come back from the field later to be trained as course instructors.

⁸⁶Baldwin, Interview.

⁸⁷Desi D. DeLeon, BORTAC Deputy Commander/Patrol Agent in Charge, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2010.

⁸⁸Ibid.

These were typically students who excelled in the course and then worked on the Iraqi international border that were then invited back to become instructors. This instructor program ensured that the program could sustain itself and last long after USBP assets had left.⁸⁹

In 2008, BPA Benitez worked with the Iraqi security forces' DBE, which included the Iraqi Border Police and Customs at the land ports of entry. BPA Benitez assisted in the training of new DBE officers and noted that they were "basically starting from scratch."⁹⁰ The DBE officers were trained mostly in drill and ceremony at their academy prior to arriving at Combat Outpost (COP) Shocker.⁹¹

BPA Benitez's team provided training and advice on things such as: tracking and sign cutting, interdictions, vehicle assaults, administrative tasks such as keeping training records, communications, USBP operations, basic law enforcement tactics, arrest and searching techniques, basic firearms skills, and surveillance. USBP agents also taught the DBE how to conduct maintenance on equipment such as power generators.⁹²

Prior to arriving in Iraq, BPA Benitez along with other USBP agents traveled to Washington, DC to train with DOS. This two weeks of training consisted of language, cultural awareness, and defensive/aggressive driving techniques. After that, the USBP

⁸⁹Desi D. DeLeon, Interview.

⁹⁰Benitez, Interview.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid.

agents traveled to a BORTAC training course where they were instructed for three weeks on land navigation, shooting from vehicles, and other tactical courses.⁹³

The DBE officers were usually prior Iraqi military service members and came from all over Iraq. Because the DBE officers were not from the local area that they were operating in, relations with land owners and local tribes was lacking. USBP agents coordinated as a liaison with local land owners and tribal leaders to improve relations with the DBE.⁹⁴

In 2001, Gregory Bovino was a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent (SBPA) with the BORTAC operating in Honduras. Gregory Bovino is now a PAIC. PAIC Bovino helped organize and train host-nation border security forces in Honduras from the ground up through a Honduran Border Security Academy that he assisted in creating. This academy was the first formalized border security training that Honduran border security forces had ever received.⁹⁵

The Honduran border security forces were a non-military organization with law enforcement capabilities, much like the USBP. BORTAC trained these forces in immigration and host nation laws, firearms, arrest techniques, identification of falsified documents, emergency driving, concealed contraband compartments, physical training, use of force, tracking, conducting traffic checkpoints, and other USBP techniques.⁹⁶

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Benitez, Interview.

⁹⁵Gregory Bovino, Patrol Agent in Charge, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 March 2010.

⁹⁶Ibid.

Associate Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) Peter Hermansen (an FOS in BORTAC at the time of deployment) planned and assisted in the creation of the Honduras Border Patrol academy. ACPA Hermansen mentioned that in addition to the training listed above, maritime operations, warrant/fugitive recovery operations, and site assessments were also conducted.⁹⁷

PAIC Timothy Sullivan (an SBPA at the time) was also a member of BORTAC serving in Honduras after PAIC Bovino in 2004. PAIC Sullivan stated that BORTAC worked in six man teams in order to train the Honduran Border Police (Policia De Fronteras). PAIC Sullivan's experience in Honduras was similar to PAIC Bovino's. PAIC Sullivan noted that in addition to basic police skills the Honduran Border Police were also trained in long range patrols, lay-in operations, and advanced weapons training.⁹⁸

PAIC Sullivan also noticed several challenges in training the Honduran Border Police. Some officers were more easily trained because they had a prior military background while others had no formalized military or police training at all prior to the Honduran Border Police Academy.⁹⁹

In 1992, BORTAC Commander ACPA Anthony Porvaznik worked in Bolivia. As a member of BORTAC, ACPA Porvaznik's rank was a Border Patrol Agent (BPA) when he trained, advised, and patrolled with UMOPAR which is part of Bolivia's Special

⁹⁷Peter Hermansen, Associate Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 13 April 2010.

⁹⁸Timothy Sullivan, Patrol Agent in Charge, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 7 March 2010.

⁹⁹Ibid.

Antinarcotics Force--Rural Area Police Patrol Unit (Unidad Móvil Policial Para Reas Rurales) also known as Los Leopardos (the Leopards). The BORTAC mission in Bolivia was to support the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in training UMOPAR officers to find, gather intelligence, and destroy clandestine cocaine laboratories in the jungles of Bolivia and to interdict the flow of narcotic precursors from the highlands into the jungles.¹⁰⁰

USBP agents worked with the U.S. Coast Guard when working along or in rivers, while transport by air was provided by DOD. BORTAC also worked with U.S. Army Special Forces medics and communication experts. Training included firearms, patrolling, mission planning, and checkpoint operations. In addition to these common USBP tasks, BORTAC trained UMOPAR in the use of explosives to destroy air strips and laboratories used for the cocaine trade. Prior to deploying to Bolivia, ACPA Porvaznik received ten days of training in Quantico, Virginia in the use of explosives, radio communications, and small unit tactics.¹⁰¹

In 2004, Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) Deputy Commander/PAIC Vincent J. Hampel deployed to Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. PAIC Hampel was a SBPA when he accompanied one other BORSTAR agent to train the Kyrgyzstan border security forces to use all-terrain vehicles (ATV) on the Kyrgyzstan and Chinese international border.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Anthony Porvaznik, BORTAC Commander/Assistant Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2 April 2010.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Vincent J. Hampel, BORSTAR Deputy Commander/Patrol Agent In Charge, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 April 2010.

Directed and funded by DOS, PAIC Hampel's mission was strictly to train the Kyrgyzstani border security forces to ride and maintain ATV's for use in border security tasks. The BORSTAR agents gave a two week course similar to the two week ATV Safety Institute course that USBP agents take to obtain ATV use certification in the U.S.¹⁰³

In 2005, BORSTAR Commander/ACPA Gerald S. Bryan also participated as a trainer and advisor for a host-nation as a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent. ACPA Bryan initiated the first U.S. search, trauma, and rescue course for Mexican multi-agency forces on the Guatemala and Mexico international border. This mission was also funded and coordinated by DOS.¹⁰⁴

During his deployment, ACPA Bryan along with approximately fifteen BORSTAR agents trained approximately fifty host-nation security forces from municipal police, military, and Grupo Beta (a Mexican multi-agency police force). The course participants were trained in swift water rescue techniques, first responder medical training, tactical rope rescues, and land navigation. The technician level course mirrored a one month BORSTAR academy for USBP BORSTAR agents.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Hampel, Interview.

¹⁰⁴Gerald S. Bryan, BORSTAR Commander/Assistant Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, Telephone interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 April 2010.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

Police Work

In Iraq, BPA Benitez's team performed police functions with the DBE in conjunction with coalition military forces. These operations included police and border security functions.¹⁰⁶

PAIC Bovino observed that the police work conducted in Honduras mirrored the law enforcement functions of USBP agents in America. Upon graduating the Honduran border security academy, the new Honduran Border Police agents worked on the Honduras and Nicaraguan international border under the supervision and mentorship of the USBP agents. An example that PAIC Bovino used was the use of checkpoints, line watch, and traffic interdiction, where violators of Honduran laws were arrested and detained by Honduran government officials under the mentorship of USBP agents. The USBP agents in Honduras were armed. However, the USBP agents were not authorized to make arrests. Only the Honduran Border Police made the arrests under the supervision of the BORTAC agents.¹⁰⁷ PAIC Sullivan also stated that dignitary police protection details and patrol functions occurred on a regular basis.¹⁰⁸

Investigations

BPA Benitez found that in Iraq, his advisory work on investigations focused on organized smuggling and crime. His team advised the DBE in support of these

¹⁰⁶Benitez, Interview.

¹⁰⁷Bovino, Interview.

¹⁰⁸Sullivan, Interview.

investigations. This support from BPA Benitez included interview techniques used with illegal immigrants who crossed into Iraq illegally from Iran.¹⁰⁹

The Honduran Border Patrol conducted investigations on a daily basis. PAIC Bovino and other BORTAC agents trained and mentored the Honduran Border Police in investigations involving false documents, illicit substance smuggling, alienage (country of citizenship), and illegal currency and dealt with these investigations on a routine basis. The investigations provided needed legitimacy for many of the arrests that the Honduran Border Police made. The USBP agents trained and mentored the Honduran Border Police agents in interrogation techniques that focused on having a goal in mind while questioning. The USBP agents also supervised the investigations to ensure that the interrogations were legitimate and conducted ethically.¹¹⁰

In Bolivia, the USBP used paid informants as a major source of intelligence to find narcotic refinement laboratories and supply routes. Informants would be dressed like the military so that they were not identified as informants. The informants then went with UMOPAR to confirm the laboratory or supply routes' location. If the information was confirmed factual then the informant was paid. Workers at the clandestine laboratories were also used as a source of intelligence and used at the time of apprehension to find more narcotics trafficking and production locations.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Benitez, Interview.

¹¹⁰Bovino, Interview.

¹¹¹Porvaznik, Interview.

Border Security

ACPA Baldwin did not patrol or conduct border security tasks while in Iraq. However, the focus of all of his mentoring, advising, and training was in sign cutting and border security operations. Using these skills in conjunction with the Border Patrol National Strategy, ACPA Baldwin advised the DOD at the Multi-National Corps-Iraq headquarters on border policy, strategy, and operations along the Iraqi international borders.¹¹²

In 2001 and for many years prior, Honduras experienced border incursions and illegal activities in their border region with Nicaragua. Prior to BORTAC's arrival, Honduras did not have a border security force. They had ports of entry with custom officials, but no security forces dedicated to operations in-between the ports of entry.

The DOS coordinated with the government of Honduras and arranged for officers from the Dallas Texas, Police Department to train the Honduran Border Police. DOS soon realized that the Dallas Texas, Police Department was doing well with training traditional police skills to the Honduran Border Police, but they lacked the expertise needed for border security.¹¹³

One of the DOS officials working on this endeavor remembered working with USBP agents in other parts of South America years prior and requested through the Immigration and Naturalization Service to employ USBP agents to deploy to Honduras. The Immigration and Naturalization Service sent several BORTAC agents for this purpose. BORTAC then took the primary role in creating and training a border security

¹¹²Baldwin, Interview.

¹¹³Bovino, Interview.

force to protect the international borders of Honduras with Nicaragua.¹¹⁴ Although customs enforcement was already established in Honduras, the Honduran Border Police also worked at airports and ports of entry.¹¹⁵

Effectiveness

ACPA Baldwin was attached to 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division where he worked with other Multi-National Corps-Iraq units and U.S. Embassy personnel. Approximately half of his time in Iraq was embedded with the National Border Transition Team at JSS Loyalty, Iraq. ACPA Baldwin also traveled to the international border regions of Iraq in order to assess the border areas where he spent the other half of his time in Iraq in various Forward Operating Bases and camps. ACPA Baldwin advised on the effectiveness of these regions through what he called “border calculus.”¹¹⁶ This entailed a combination of statistical data involving personnel, infrastructure, and technology applied to the international borders and used as measures of performance and effectiveness. ACPA Baldwin also used the DOD’s feedback as a measure of effectiveness.¹¹⁷

ACPA Baldwin observed that the effectiveness of the training, advising, and mentoring were adversely affected by the six month and one year rotations of the DOD

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Sullivan, Interview.

¹¹⁶Baldwin, Interview.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

and DHS.¹¹⁸ PAIC DeLeon observed that the two week course to train the DBE officers was effective and did raise their level of proficiency as border security officers, but a longer academy would have been better. BORTAC agents have reported to PAIC DeLeon that in the field after graduating the academy the DBE officers are proving that the training was effective.¹¹⁹ An effective staggered rotation of personnel for the DBE officers at COP Shocker was the deployment of civilian border security contractors along with USBP agents. The contractor at the COP was Dyna Corp. which consisted of mainly prior USBP agents. Dyna Corp and the USBP rotations were staggered so that the program and training objectives were not started over or drastically changed from rotation to rotation. The rapport between the USBP agents and Dyna Corp contractors was positive and created smooth transitions when rotations occurred. It took months to develop a trusting relationship with the DBE officers so having other trainers already established maintained steady progress.¹²⁰

ACPA Baldwin learned that nepotism and corruption is a fundamental problem among the Iraqi security forces. Until this unethical behavior is stopped, the borders and ports of entry in Iraq will never be completely secured.¹²¹ BPA Benitez made a similar observance of corruption in the Iraqi governmental system.¹²²

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹DeLeon, Interview.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Baldwin, Interview.

¹²²Benitez, Interview.

BPA Benitez observed that DBE officers at a port of entry (POE) were accustomed to accepting bribes. He also saw DBE officers paying land owners a fee whenever they used roads that passed through their land. USBP agents explained to the DBE officers that they did not have to pay the land owners for use of public roads. However, the DBE officers preferred doing so because it provided order. The DBE officers paid the fee to avoid conflict and it made them feel safer as they traversed the roads.¹²³

BPA Benitez does feel that the USBP efforts at COP Shocker with the DBE were effective. To illustrate this he stated that there were two hundred DBE officers at the COP when he arrived. After departing, the COP was reduced in DBE officers to one hundred officers. No more USBP agents have been assigned to the COP because the DBE is now trained and capable of protecting and enforcing border security in their area of operations. BPA Benitez also noted that when he observed enforcement patrols and checkpoints that the DBE officers were effective and capable.¹²⁴

PAIC Bovino felt his operation was a success and that the graduates of the Honduran Border Police academy could effectively patrol the international border of Honduras and Nicaragua for the first time. Thus, this operation was a success for BORTAC and the Honduran government. The Honduran Border Police were now accepted as a legitimate and necessary law enforcement organization for the country of Honduras. Routine investigations also proved effective and resulted in many arrests for illegal activity. As PAIC Bovino witnessed an increase in the officers employed by the

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Benitez, Interview.

Honduran Border Police, he also saw an increase in their intensity, confidence, and effectiveness.¹²⁵

ACPA Hermansen stated that the Honduran Border Patrol academy was a success. The Honduran Minister of Security was very pleased with the results of the academy. ACPA Hermansen saw the effectiveness through the high rate of apprehensions in the field, graduation rates, increased morale, positive host nation and embassy response, and increased level of professionalism among the Honduran Border Patrol Agents. While ACPA Hermansen was in Honduras he witnessed a successful fugitive recovery and a large weapon seizure on the Honduras and Nicaraguan border that spoke to the level of the Honduran Border Patrol Agents' level of effectiveness.¹²⁶

With the specialized training from the USBP, the Honduran Border Police also improved their status among law enforcement agencies. Prior to their training and successful mission accomplishments the Honduran Border Police were viewed as merely border security guards. However, over time they were able to prove themselves as a capable and effective group of Honduran federal agents.¹²⁷

PAIC Bovino has deployed to several countries with BORTAC and has learned that many third world countries face ethical and corruption problems. However, during his deployment to Honduras the USBP agents closely monitored and supervised operations and never allowed corrupt or unethical practices to occur under their watch.¹²⁸

¹²⁵Bovino, Interview.

¹²⁶Hermansen, Interview.

¹²⁷Sullivan, Interview.

¹²⁸Bovino, Interview.

PAIC Sullivan never witnessed corruption in Honduras, “but there was always a sense of skepticism.”¹²⁹

PAIC Bovino stated that there were also long term strategic successes as a result of BORTAC efforts in Honduras. By providing mentoring and training to other host-nations, the traffickers of illicit contraband such as drugs and weapons as well as Mara Salvatrucha Thirteen gang members must face U.S. trained law enforcement forces before ever reaching U.S. international borders. This approach to extending assistance to other host-nations creates an extension to U.S. border security.¹³⁰

Although this operation had initial successes, its long term strategic outcome is not assured.¹³¹ The Honduran Border Police were successful and showed improvement throughout the operation under the supervision of the USBP agents. However, the USBP no longer assists, trains, or mentors the Honduran Border Police. According to PAIC Bovino, as a result the organization faces a decline in the effectiveness of border security now that the USBP is not there to advise and mentor. The U.S. government has conducted similar missions in Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama, but has not made efforts to maintain the gains made in Honduras.¹³²

PAIC Sullivan went further to say that the Honduran Border Police had a lack of capable leadership that may affect their overall success in the long term. PAIC Sullivan also used an example to exhibit the flawed system of law in Honduras that reduced the

¹²⁹Sullivan, Interview.

¹³⁰Bovino, Interview.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid.

effectiveness of the Honduran Border Police. If, in the performance of their duties, a Honduran Border Police agent gets into a shooting with a criminal, both the criminal and the Honduran Border Police agent will go to prison until a lengthy investigation is performed. During such time the Honduran Border Police agent waits in prison for possibly years until the court system sorts everything out. Not only does this unnecessarily take manpower out of the force, it scares other agents from doing their jobs or protecting themselves for fear of imprisonment.¹³³

ACPA Porvaznik saw his mission in Bolivia as effective and with few limitations. BORTAC served as a good example for UMOPAR to learn from and follow. During the 1990s the Drug Enforcement Agency had more funding than the USBP and he was impressed with the amount and quality of the equipment that was supplied to the USBP agents and UMOPAR.¹³⁴

PAIC Hampel was pleased with the performance of the Kyrgyzstan border security forces. He observed their improved performance throughout their two week course and upon passing their end of course test. It was obvious that his training made the participants safe and confident ATV riders that could effectively use ATV's in the performance of their border security tasks.¹³⁵

One challenge that could have adversely affected the effectiveness of the ATV course was the lack of preparation for the course. PAIC Hampel was notified approximately one week prior to deploying to Kyrgyzstan and received no additional

¹³³Sullivan, Interview.

¹³⁴Porvaznik, Interview.

¹³⁵Hampel, Interview.

training or preparation time for this mission. Upon arrival he found that the inclement cold weather included snow, sleet, ice, and frigid cold temperatures which were amplified when riding ATV's. The Kyrgyzstan border security forces taking the course were dressed in jeans and dress shoes and had no cold weather gear. Eventually they received the proper cold weather gear, but the lack of preparation slowed down the productiveness of the training objectives.¹³⁶

The inclement weather also resulted in a few minor ATV accidents, but no one was hurt as a result and the new ATV fleet remained in good condition. As the course went on, the Kyrgyzstan government wanted to add more and more officers each day to the course. However, the BORSTAR agents had to explain that the officers had to begin the course at the beginning to remain effective and to pass the course. Adding people in the middle of the course was then not permitted in an effort to train and certify only those who completed the entire course.¹³⁷

ACPA Bryan learned that to successfully train the multi-agency search, trauma, and rescue team in southern Mexico the BORSTAR agents first needed to teach the host-nation forces basic swimming skills. The BORSTAR agents did not expect that the course participants would begin the course not knowing how to swim. The agents considered not training the swift water rescue due to the large lack of swimming skill in the group. The decision was made to train the host-nation security forces in swimming and then rapidly transitioning into swift water rescue.¹³⁸

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Hampel, Interview.

¹³⁸Bryan, Interview.

The BORSTAR course in the jungles of southern Mexico was effective based on the overall improvement and performance of the host-nation security forces. This jungle region of Mexico is often dealing with flooding and the rescues involved with such natural disasters. BORSTAR has been requested back and has performed more of these academies in southern Mexico as a result of their effectiveness.¹³⁹

At the end of the course ACPA Bryan described a story of a fifty year old participant who started the program afraid of being in the water. At the course graduation the Mexican media was present and the fifty year old man became the demonstrator for diving techniques. The fifty year old man, along with many other participants, were deeply moved and appreciated the valuable life saving instruction that BORSTAR agents provided to them.¹⁴⁰

Local Sentiment

ACPA Baldwin felt the local Iraqi populace did not appreciate his presence. He felt that the local Iraqi government was slow to accept mentorship or advice, and did so reluctantly.¹⁴¹

PAIC Bovino experienced a completely different sentiment from the host-nation of Honduras. The Honduran Border Police and the government of Honduras treated the USBP agents with acceptance and gratitude. PAIC Bovino stated that BORTAC agents always approach each host-nation with cultural awareness and sensitivity. As a result, the

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Bryan, Interview.

¹⁴¹Baldwin, Interview.

USBP agents worked, lived, and socialized with the Honduran Border Police and the local populace.¹⁴²

When the first BORATAC mission started in Honduras the USBP agents lived in a hotel. As time progressed BORATAC was able to rent apartments with the local populace. This change enhanced the trust and camaraderie among all of the parties involved. Living with the local populace also aided in the fluency of the USBP agent's Spanish skills. All USBP agents learn to read and speak in the Spanish language, however, some of the USBP agents' Spanish skills were not as fluent as needed to be effective. After just two weeks of living with the local populace the USBP agents became fluent enough to teach in the Spanish language.¹⁴³ Communicating in Spanish and English was not issue for PAIC Sullivan and his six man team in Honduras either.¹⁴⁴

PAIC Sullivan had a positive experience and was accepted by the Honduran government and was treated as a tourist in the cities. However, in the rural areas, USBP agents were treated as outsiders. The populace in the rural areas wanted to know "why they were in their country."¹⁴⁵ ACPA Bryan confirmed this same sentiment with the Mexican government and the Mexican populace, where the general public grew distasteful of their presence.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴²Bovino, Interview.

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Bryan, Interview.

USBP Limitations

ACPA Baldwin noticed restrictions on freedom of movement in Iraq and lack of resources were significant limitations. ACPA Baldwin stated that transportation was difficult to coordinate. He also received little guidance from DHS or CBP once inside Iraq. Few resources were provided by DHS and CBP and ACPA Baldwin's team had to adapt and work with DOD to secure most of their resources.¹⁴⁷ Similarly, BPA Benitez found transportation to be a challenge to secure.¹⁴⁸

BPA Benitez recalled that there was only one vehicle at COP Shocker, where he was located. Fuel was severely limited and the DBE was only allotted approximately one tank of fuel per week. Therefore, most patrols were performed by foot and the one assigned vehicle was rarely used for more than driving to pick up resupply such as food from Forward Operating Bases. DBE COP's were spaced much further apart than what BPA Benitez saw on the U.S. and Mexico international border. This lack of infrastructure made patrolling the vast borders of Iraq more difficult.¹⁴⁹

The lack of fuel also limited operations at the COP. The power generator was only turned on for approximately one hour each day. Therefore, everyone at the COP was extremely busy trying to generate reports, cool down and prepare food, charge batteries, and use any electronic devices within the minimal time allotted.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷Baldwin, Interview.

¹⁴⁸Benitez, Interview.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

BPA Benitez also noted that supplies limited operations. DBE officers did not have a standard uniform or even an identifiable patch. The DBE officers were not issued an intermediate force device such as pepper spray, baton, or taser; nor were they issued a sufficient amount of ammunition.¹⁵¹ PAIC DeLeon stated that uniforms and essential equipment were scarce at the initial training academy in Jordan as well.¹⁵²

While the regular police were supplied with their initial gear at the facility, the border police were afforded much less. PAIC DeLeon was constantly working to obtain boots, uniforms, and other essential equipment for his border police students. Even classroom space and phone calls were difficult to acquire when PAIC DeLeon first arrived at the International Police Training Center in Jordan. In addition to this, there were pay issues for the Iraqi border police students where they went for considerable amounts of time without being paid by their host-nation.¹⁵³

The DBE did not receive regular food rations at COP Shocker, due to delivery issues and lack of support from higher DBE officials. As a result, time was set aside for fishing for food. Cleanliness and sanitation of food preparation was also an ongoing concern for the USBP agents.¹⁵⁴

BPA Benitez's team also faced challenges with the environment. Iraq was a war zone with a hostile population. The lack of infrastructure in remote areas of the desert did create challenges with his team's operations. In COP Shocker's area of operations the

¹⁵¹Benitez, Interview.

¹⁵²DeLeon, Interview

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴Benitez, Interview.

Iranian border was on high ground while the Iraqi side of the international border was on the low ground which created a tactical disadvantage. Due to Iraq's previous conflict with Iran, the international border between Iraq and Iran was covered with land mines, which limited patrols in the area. Few roads were in good condition and traversing an area to respond to border incursions took lengthy periods of time as well.¹⁵⁵

Some USBP agents in Honduras did not feel that they were limited by their resources to effectively accomplish their mission. In fact, PAIC Bovino felt that DOS funded the missions well and the Honduran government also supported the endeavor. PAIC Bovino stated that they had enough ammunition to practice shooting tactics more than they did in the USBP's own academy for trainee USBP agents.¹⁵⁶

PAIC Sullivan had a contrary experience in the equipping of the Honduran Border Police. PAIC Sullivan observed few resources being supplied by the host-nation of Honduras and the U.S. government. PAIC Sullivan found that a large portion of his efforts was trying to provide the Honduran Border Police with proper equipment and advanced training to counter the large criminal element that Honduras faced.¹⁵⁷ However, PAIC Sullivan and PAIC Bovino both stated that the Honduran Border Police did the best that they could with what they had which led to their mission success.¹⁵⁸

Both PAIC Bovino and PAIC Sullivan agreed that the climate and terrain did not limit mission success. To the contrary, both agreed that the jungle terrain was conducive

¹⁵⁵Benitez, Interview.

¹⁵⁶Bovino, Interview.

¹⁵⁷Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁵⁸Bovino, Interview; Sullivan, Interview.

to USBP's approach to tracking and sign cutting which was successfully taught to and used by the Honduran Border Police.¹⁵⁹ PAIC Sullivan has traveled to several countries around the world and has not been limited by terrain due to the USBP experience of operating in all types of environments while patrolling U.S. international borders.¹⁶⁰

ACPA Bryan stated that the initial implementation of a BORSTAR instructed course in southern Mexico involved many minor logistical problems such as finding a swimming pool to train at. Switching from the desert southwest of the U.S. to the jungles of southern Mexico also made the rope rescue and land navigation portions of the course a challenge that were overcome.¹⁶¹

The historical interviews offered an in depth look at the criteria which address the primary and secondary questions brought forth in chapter 1. In addition to the USBP deployments mentioned above, the USBP has assisted, advised, and trained security forces all over the globe. For example, there are currently 9 BORTAC agents deployed to Guatemala training three brigades and federal border police in mission planning, checkpoints, and patrolling operations. This is typically a Special Forces mission; however, with few Special Forces personnel available BORTAC is assisting in filling this gap.¹⁶² In the next chapter (5), the criteria from the interviews and literature review are submitted to address questions and prove the thesis.

¹⁵⁹Bovino, Interview; Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁶⁰Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁶¹Bryan, Interview.

¹⁶²Porvaznik, Interview.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The thesis for this paper is that the USBP should assist in the conduct of overseas stability operations by providing Border Patrol agents to train host-nation border security forces, thus contributing specialized skill sets to the United State's whole of government approach. The purpose of this research was to prove this thesis by answering the specific criteria addressed in chapter 4.

Chapter 5 is organized by concluding the findings in chapters 2 and 4 and addressing the criteria and questions presented in chapters 1 and 4. Following the conclusion, recommendations are made.

The literature review examined the projected future of stability operations for the U.S. military and what DHS views as the future of interagency participation in stability operations. Secondary questions such as "What are the requirements of the U.S. military to achieve stability," and "What are the implications of cross border basing" and "what are the border security needs," were answered through literature review. COIN and border security work hand in hand to promote stability in a host-nation as well as increase revenue for a host-nation. Successful COIN requires effective and efficient border security to prevent resupply of insurgents, cross border smuggling of narcotics for insurgency funding, and other types of insurgent support such as basing in neighboring nations.¹⁶³

¹⁶³Joes, 236.

The literature review and the interviews established that the U.S. Army does conduct tasks that are similar to USBP operations during stability operations. These tasks could be performed by USBP agents to take advantage of their expertise and experience in border security. Aside from additional security and transportation resources used to support USBP efforts, USBP contributions could reduce the number of U.S. military forces used for similar tasks.

For example, the U.S. military provides for equipping, training, and advising host-nation security forces in Afghanistan. These are integral elements to developing an effective host-nation security force.¹⁶⁴ Although the USBP does not currently contribute a large number of agents to stability operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. military is providing training, coordination of enforcement, and advising of host-nation border security forces in Afghanistan. These tasks could be performed by USBP agents, thus relieving resources for the U.S. military and providing expert training and advice to host-nation security forces. The USBP has not provided the U.S. military or the Afghanistan government the support that they are capable of providing to the porous borders of Afghanistan.

Interpretation of Findings Described in Chapter 4

A review of DOD doctrine was used to identify the requirements for border security in an effort to create stability in a region. Doctrine revealed the need to administer a rule of law, border security, freedom of movement, and the use of

¹⁶⁴Tanner, 319-320.

checkpoints. DOD also recognized the importance of a combined effort of civilian and military agencies.

Interviews with USBP agents who have participated in stability operations overseas were used to identify how those requirements are currently being met. These interviewees were particularly utilized in training and advisory roles. The interviews were also used to answer the question of how should or could the USBP contribute to the whole of government approach to the stability operations, interviews were performed with USBP agents who have worked outside of the U.S. with host-nation border security. The interviews also identified gaps and limitations to the U.S. military's requirements for successful stability operations.

The interviews confirmed USBP agents have served in an effort to increase the border security in many host-nations. The contributions included many of the questions asked in chapter 4. The USBP has provided training, advising, police work, investigations, and border security to nations all over the globe. The interviews also identified what USBP assets, resources, skill sets, and capabilities could fill the gaps in the U.S. military's abilities to achieve stability in a host-nation. These skills included training, police work, and investigations. All of the USBP contributions outside of the Continental United States included training of host-nation border security forces.

USBP agents have the experience to train host-nations, the U.S. military, and assist in planning border security operations. Training in police work and border security functions were conducted in most USBP's deployments to other host-nations. Along with most common U.S. policing activities, checkpoints, line watch, traffic interdiction,

dignitary police protection details, patrol functions,¹⁶⁵ immigration and host nation laws, firearms, arrest techniques, identification of falsified documents, emergency driving, concealed contraband compartments, physical training, use of force, as well as detention and arrest functions.¹⁶⁶

The USBP provided training and advice on how to conduct investigations as part of their support to the host-nations normal police functions. Investigations included human intelligence, surveillance, and using several sources to legitimize findings for analysis and use.¹⁶⁷ Training and advice regarding border security was the fundamental contribution that USBP agents provided to any given host-nation. USBP agents have advised Multi-National Corps-Iraq on border policy, strategy, and operations along the Iraqi international borders.¹⁶⁸ USBP agents have also trained, advised, and worked along side host-nation border security forces such as in Iraq, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, and in Honduras.¹⁶⁹

The interviews revealed that USBP agents are used to working in harsh terrain and during conflict. This implies that USBP agents could be used more readily in unstable environments because they have done so on the international borders of the U.S. and they have done so overseas.

¹⁶⁵Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁶⁶Bovino, Interview.

¹⁶⁷Benitez, Interview

¹⁶⁸Baldwin, Interview.

¹⁶⁹Bovino, Interview; Sullivan, Interview.

The research for this paper also identified the USBP's limiting factors in assisting the U.S. military. Resources such as ammunition and vehicles were not readily available in most host-nations. USBP agents found themselves heavily dependent on U.S. military resources for security and transportation in Iraq.¹⁷⁰ In Honduras supplies and equipment were running low for the Honduran Border Police.¹⁷¹ Unique and rough terrain conditions also were limiting factors for USBP agents in Iraq.¹⁷²

There were some unexpected findings. USBP agents secure the international border between Mexico and the U.S. while always understanding the inherent corruption in dealing with the Mexican government. However, as the American idea of democracy spreads, it is obvious that the American ethical perspective on corruption is not shared by many of the host-nations.

Poor coordination and planning affected the majority of the USBP operations overseas. Lack of equipment for mission assignments was limited and non-existent in certain areas. In Iraq, we saw locations where DBE officers had no uniforms, secondary use of force items, not enough bullets, a lack of food, a lack of vehicles, and not enough fuel.¹⁷³

A lack of guidance and prior training for the mission or deployment can also be attributed to a lack of planning. Strategic and operational guidance lead to constant changes of mission. It takes more than a memorandum of agreement between the U.S.

¹⁷⁰Baldwin, Interview.

¹⁷¹Sullivan, Interview.

¹⁷²Benitez, Interview.

¹⁷³Ibid.

military and the USBP for a successful operation. Prior planning is a necessary component to any joint operation.

Recommendations

For further study, finding specific methods in which federal agencies and the U.S. military deal with corrupt governments should be addressed. USBP's experiences in dealing with corruption could fill any other gaps or assist the U.S. military in stability operations in countries where ethical culture varies drastically from U.S. practices and standards. Working in host-nations and leading by example would aid in combating corruption.

The USBP should be utilized more frequently in stability operations. This is especially true in theatres such as Afghanistan, where international borders are porous and where the U.S. military needs the assistance of the USBP to provide advice and expertise as well as to provide training. The U.S. military has been training host nation border police and other security forces on a large scale in their stability and COIN efforts. The USBP can provide expertise and ease the burden of this task, especially in training and advising host-nation security forces in police work, investigations, and border security functions. USBP would need resources to accomplish this. Providing a host-nation with highly trained and deployable personnel such as USBP agents would be worth the investment.

With increased deployment of USBP personnel, additional planning should take place to ensure that the agents have the proper equipment and guidance to complete their missions. This includes the planning necessary to ensure that the host-nation security

forces being trained have the equipment necessary to conduct border security prior to the arrival of USBP agents.

The USBP should continue to expand into training more host-nation security forces to assist the U.S. military in creating and enhancing host-nation border security forces. With the incredible utility of the USBP agent's skill sets and experiences, more personnel, money, and resources should be used to leverage this valuable resource in stability operations to support the whole of government approach.

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Main Questions:

1. Describe the training involved when you were deployed.
 - Was the training to the host-nation forces effective?
 - How effective was the training to the security forces?
 - What types of training were conducted?
 - Did the training accomplish the mission requirements?
2. What type of police work functions were performed?
 - Did you perform any policing activities while deployed?
 - Please describe the common police practices that were used while in the host-nation.
 - Do you feel that the police work that you performed was effective?
 - Why do you believe that the policing functions were successful to your mission?
3. What types of investigations were performed while you were deployed?
 - What did you investigate while deployed?
 - What was the effectiveness of your investigations in the host-nation?
 - What measures did you use to judge the legitimacy of your investigations?
 - What did you do to ensure accurate investigations were conducted?
4. Please give a description of the border security tasks performed.
 - What were the functions that you performed as a USBP agent in the host-nation in regards to border security?
 - What specific border security tasks were you charged to perform?
 - How effective were the border security tasks performed in the host-nation?
 - What were the measures of effectiveness of the border security tasks performed?

Secondary or Follow-up Questions:

- Where did your overseas efforts with the USBP take place and what were the approximate dates?
- What was the nature of your deployment? (i.e. your tasks or missions, disaster relief, security forces training, drug and smuggling interdiction)
- While deployed what sections of military or civilian agencies did you work with?
- What is your current rank with the USBP and what was your rank at the time of your overseas efforts?
- Can you describe your experience while overseas?
- Do you feel that you were deployed the appropriate amount of time to be effective in accomplishing your mission?

- What was the local populace's and the local government's attitude toward your presence in the host-nation?
- Did you have any problems with corruption, dishonesty or did you have any ethical issues concerning host-nation government or security forces?
- While deployed did you learn anything that aided you in maximizing efforts?
- Did you encounter any financial or resource issues that hindered the effectiveness of your deployment?
- How did you evaluate the success of your efforts, i.e. lives saved, border incursions reduced?
- Were there any language barriers and how were the barriers resolved?
- Please describe the equipment that you had available and any sustainment issues that you encountered.
- What special skills, knowledge, experience, and training did you provide to the host-nation's security forces?
- Please describe the training that you provided in policing, intelligence gathering and analysis, surveillance, interviewing, and border patrol tactics such as sign cutting.
- While deployed, did you feel limited or hindered in any way from accomplishing agency goal? What caused this?
- Were there any physical environment concerns, pertinent terrain information or obstacles?

APPENDIX B

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: (760) 562-6590 or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

3. I, _____, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: _____ concerning the

following topic: _____.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

_____ None _____ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Name of Interviewee	Signature	Date
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Accepted on Behalf of the Army by	Date
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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, PETER HERMANSEN, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 4/13/10 concerning the
following topic: FOREIGN DEPLOYMENTS.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

PETER HERMANSEN [Signature] 4/14/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

ANTHONY S. GOOD and her Good 4/14/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, SCOTT BAYAN, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 04/09/10 concerning the
following topic: OCONUS DEPLOYMENTS

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

SCOTT BAYAN [Signature] 04/07/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good [Signature] 4/7/10
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, PAIC Gregory Bovino, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: March 8, 2010 concerning the
following topic: US Border Patrol oversens deployment.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Greg Bovino Gregory Bovino 3/8/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good Anthony S. Good 3/8/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, DESI D DELEON, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 2 APR 2010 concerning the

following topic: JORDAN TRAINING MISSION.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

DESI D DELEON [Signature] 2 APR 2010
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. GOOD [Signature] 04/02/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, VINCENT J. HAMPEL, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 4/8/10 concerning the

following topic: OCOMUS Deployments.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

VINCENT J. HAMPEL [Signature] 4/7/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good [Signature] 4/7/10
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, Anthony Porraznik, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 2 APRIL 10 concerning the

following topic: OCONUS Deployments.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

None Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Anthony Porraznik Anthony Scott Good 2 APRIL 10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good ant for Good 04/2/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: (760) 562-6590 or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

I, Timothy Sullivan participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 8 March 2010 concerning the

following topic: Contributions to the Whole of Government Approach to Stability Operations

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Timothy A. Sullivan ri Scott 8 March 2010
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good an Scott Good 3/8/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

I, RANDALL BALDWIN, participated in an oral history interview conducted by

Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: MARCH 8, 2010 concerning the

following topic: USBP CONTRIBUTIONS TO STABILITY OPS.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

☒ None ☐ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

RANDALL BALDWIN Randall H. Baldwin 3/8/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date

Anthony S. Good Anthony S. Good 3/8/2010
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

Annex B

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To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, MAURICIO BENITEZ, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
Anthony Scott Good, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: 3/29/10 concerning the
following topic: IRAQ

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

MGB None ☒ Other: ☐

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

MAURICIO BENITEZ [Signature] 3/29/10
Name of Interviewee Signature Date
Anthony Scott Good 3/29/10
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by Date

APPENDIX C

ASSUMPTIONS

- 1) Effective border security is an integral and necessary requirement for a host-nation to secure peace and stability for its people.
- 2) The U.S. military will engage in irregular warfare with stability operations throughout this decade and beyond.
- 3) The majority of stability operations will require police and security forces. These forces will be required to provide border security.
- 4) Border security will provide for free trade and stop the flow of illegal activity through the international borders of the host-nation.
- 5) As the U.S. military becomes more dispersed across the world, the U.S. government will become more dependent upon federal interagency support and resources to fill gaps.
- 6) Insurgency and terrorist operations will depend on additional support from foreign nations.¹⁷⁴ This means that border security is and will continue to be a high priority for the war on terrorism.

¹⁷⁴O'Neill, 112-113.

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Bryan, Gerald S., BORSTAR Commander/Assistant Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol. Telephone interview by author. Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 8 April 2010.

DeLeon, Desi D., BORTAC Deputy Commander/Patrol Agent in Charge, U.S. Border Patrol. Telephone interview by author. Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 2 April 2010.

Hampel, Vincent J., BORSTAR Deputy Commander/Patrol Agent in Charge, U.S. Border Patrol. Telephone interview by author. Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 8 April 2010.

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